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Abstract 
This paper analyzes empirically the coalition formation of local governments. 
We introduce a novel econometric strategy involving choice based sampling 
from a spatial network to allow for multi-partner mergers in our empirical 
analysis. We apply our method to recent municipality mergers in Finland. The 
mergers were decided voluntarily by municipal councils but the central 
government promoted mergers through a subsidy scheme. Our main interest lies 
on the association of local politics with the merger decisions. Moreover, we are 
able to estimate the causal effect of the subsidy scheme on the merger decisions 
using a regression discontinuity design. We find that the local political 
environment is relevant for the merger decision making. The results are 
consistent with politicians’ strategic behavior concerning private incentives on 
municipal employment possibilities and re-election. Furthermore, more 
concentrated political power at the local level seems to promote merging and 
different political parties hold different views concerning merging. The central 
government merger subsidy scheme has an effect on the type of mergers that 
took place. Overall, the results imply that local politics may hinder optimal 
coalition formation and that the central government may act as a corrective force 
by using an appropriate subsidy scheme.  
Keywords: Coalition formation, Local politics, Merger subsidy, Choice based 
sampling, Regression discontinuity design 
JEL classification numbers: H71, H72, H77, C35 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan empiirisesti kuntaliitosten syntyyn vaikuttavia 
tekijöitä. Tutkimuksessa esitellään uusi spatiaalisesta verkostosta tapahtuva 
ositettu valintaperusteinen otantamenetelmä, jota hyödynnetään Suomen 
kuntaliitosten analysoinnissa. Otantamenetelmä mahdollistaa monikuntaliitosten 
analysoinnin. Tutkimuksen keskeisenä mielenkiinnon kohteena on kunnallis-
politiikan yhteys kuntaliitospäätöksiin. Lisäksi tarkastellaan valtion myöntämän 
yhdistymisavustuksen kausaalivaikutusta regressioepäjatkuvuusmenetelmän 
avulla. Tulosten mukaan kunnallispolitiikalla on merkittävä rooli kuntaliitosten 
taustalla. Kunnallispolitiikka ja kunnanvaltuutettujen henkilökohtaiset poliitti-
seen uraan ja siviilityöuraan liittyvät vaikuttimet näyttävät vaikeuttavan kunnan 
asukkaiden kannalta optimaalisten kuntaliitosten muodostumista. Toinen 
merkittävä tulos tutkimuksesta on se, että valtion myöntämällä yhdistymis-
avustuksella on ollut positiivinen vaikutus kuntaliitoksiin. Näin ollen oikein 
räätälöidyllä yhdistymistuella on periaatteessa mahdollista korjata paikallis-
politiikan aiheuttamat ongelmat liitostilanteissa. 
Asiasanat: Kuntaliitokset, kunnallispolitiikka, yhdistymistuki, valintaperusteinen 
otanta, regressioepäjatkuvuusmenetelmä  
JEL-luokittelu: H71, H72, H77, C35 
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1   Introduction 
The formation and dissolution of nations and local jurisdictions like school 
districts, municipalities or counties, agreeing on political coalitions and deciding 
memberships in international cooperative organizations like the UN and WTO 
are all examples of coalition formation. Both history and recent news are full of 
examples that highlight the practical importance of understanding the 
mechanisms that, for example, draw the borders between nations. Both the 
formation and dissolution of Soviet Union is an example of large scale coalition 
formation and in Belgium the question whether it should be one or two nations is 
always bubbling under. Due to its significant economic and political importance, 
coalition formation has attracted interest from both policy makers and theoretical 
and empirical researchers. The main questions in this literature are how many 
and what type of coalitions should be optimally formed and how is the optimal 
distribution of coalitions achieved.  
Economic theorists have been active for long in this field. The vast literature on 
fiscal federalism is concentrated on the question of assignment of functions and 
taxes to different levels of government1. A central result summarized in Oates’ 
(1972) decentralization theorem is that in the absence of cost-savings from the 
centralized provision of public goods and of interjurisdictional externalities, 
decision making should be decentralized. A related result due to Tiebout (1956) 
offers decentralization as a tool for efficient pricing of local public goods in a 
world where mobile households shop for a suitable tax and public good 
combination offered by different local jurisdictions. However, these strands of 
literature leave open the issue of where and how local jurisdictions arise in the 
first place.  
Later work on endogenous mergers and coalition formation by e.g. Miceli 
(1993), Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003) and Bolton and Roland (1997) 
emphasize the fundamental trade-off between economies of scale in the 
production of public goods (which favors merging) and regional heterogeneity in 
preferences (which favors separation). This trade-off determines the optimal size 
of a given coalition. Bradford and Oates (1974) argue that internalizing inter-
jurisdictional spillovers may also justify mergers of local jurisdictions. Alesina 
and Spolaore (1997), Bolton and Roland (1997) and Ellingsen (1998) discuss 
how politics may cause departures from welfare maximizing coalition formation. 
Alesina and Spolaore (1997) show that the equilibrium under within jurisdiction 
majority voting is suboptimal to the one achieved under a global social planner.  
Empirical contributions to this field are more recent. Brasington (1999, 2003a, 
2003b), Gordon and Knight (2009) and Weese (2009) use different methods but 
are all fundamentally concerned with optimal coalition formation and the 
                                                 
1 See Oates (1999) for an overview of this literature. 
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characteristics of optimal coalitions in terms of economies scale and preference 
heterogeneity. However, they abstract away from political considerations.  
Our main contribution is to provide the first empirical analysis of departures 
from optimality in coalition formation by asking whether local politics hinder the 
optimal formation of local governments. To our knowledge, there is no previous 
empirical work that looks at the political decision making process behind 
coalition formation. The institutional background to our analysis is a recent surge 
of municipality mergers in Finland. Empirical analysis of local government 
coalition formation, in particular, is very useful in order for us to understand the 
driving forces behind coalition formation, because it allows for many 
observations of merger decisions that take place within the same legal, economic 
and cultural institutions while plausibly maintaining external validity with 
respect to other interesting coalition formation games. Empirical analysis using, 
for example, nations as the unit observation would be very challenging in 
comparison. 
Besides providing important information on coalition formation mechanisms in 
general, our application of municipal mergers should be of practical interest to 
countries with a multilayer system of government. There have been a number of 
recent examples of municipality mergers, such as in Germany in the late 1990’s 
and 2000’s, in Japan in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s and in Denmark in 2007. 
In all these cases, the merger decisions were mostly made at the local level. This 
raises the important question of how the local political environment affects the 
merger decisions. For example, do local politicians really care about economies 
of scale in local public good or service provision or are they more interested in 
their own re-election chances if a particular merger goes through? Or more 
generally, who, the central or the local governments, should decide the number 
and characteristics of the coalitions? 
The Finnish municipal merger data is of special interest because we observe 
some interesting characteristics of the municipal councils that allow us to study 
whether council members’ private incentives are associated with their decisions 
concerning mergers. The mergers in our data were decided voluntarily by the 
municipal councils and we are interested in whether the local political 
environment, as measured by different municipal council characteristics, hinders 
otherwise sensible mergers or promotes suboptimal mergers.  
Another attractive feature of our data set is that simultaneously to analyzing the 
potential departures from optimality caused by the local politics, we are able 
evaluate one potential solution to this problem. Namely, we evaluate the 
effectiveness of a central government merger subsidy program. The Finnish 
central government grants merger subsidies to merging municipalities according 
to a complex step function of the number of disappearing municipalities and 
populations of the municipalities involved in the merger. This exogenously set 
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step function allows us to use regression discontinuity design to analyze the 
causal effect of the subsidy program on merger activity. That is, we are able to 
study whether local politics hinder optimal coalition formation and whether the 
central government is able to influence the decisions of local governments. In 
accordance with existing empirical literature, we also study how municipal 
population characteristics, characteristics related to costs of providing statutory 
services and municipal tax bases are associated with merger decisions. We also 
analyze within coalition heterogeneity of these characteristics.  
Econometric modeling of spatial merger decisions is complicated for a number of 
reasons. In our analysis, the main econometric problem that we face is the high 
number of multi-partner mergers or one-to-many matching. We solve this 
problem by combining Wernicke’s (2005) network detection algorithm with 
stratified choice-based sampling. This sampling design is our main 
methodological contribution. It has many attractive properties for future coalition 
formation studies. Namely, that we can apply the results from voluminous 
choice-based sampling literature directly, we are able to use computationally 
simple reduced form estimation techniques that, unlike the existing methods, 
allows for a large set of covariates and we can conduct statistical inference with a 
relatively small amount of actual mergers. Moreover, the sampling design allows 
us to incorporate existing tools of causal inference into the analysis. Using our 
stratified choice based sampled data we analyze coalition formation by using a 
conditional logit analysis where potential coalitions are used as the unit of 
observation and also by estimating Poirier’s (1980) bivariate probit model with 
partial observability which can accommodate for two-sided decision making of 
individual municipalities. By sorting the data by population, as suggested by 
Brasington (2003a), the Poirier model allows us to analyze whether some of the 
associations are heterogeneous with respect to the size of potential merger 
partners. We incorporate our regression discontinuity design to both of the 
modeling approaches. 
Our main result is that the local political environment has a very important role 
in the merger decision making. Councilors seem to act strategically indicating 
concerns over both re-election and future employment prospects of their day job. 
Furthermore, political fragmentation seems to hinder coalition formation. 
Different political parties also have different preferences concerning merging. 
This means that both the political environment and the private incentives of local 
politicians may hinder optimal coalition formation. Based on our regression 
discontinuity analysis, the government merger subsidy scheme has been a 
successful policy, at least in a sense that it has had an effect on the likelihood and 
type of mergers that took place. This indicates that the central government may 
be able act as counterforce to local politics and possibly pave way to more 
optimal mergers. However, analyzing the welfare effects of this policy is beyond 
the scope of this paper.  Overall, our empirical results call for richer theoretical 
analyses that should model the individual decision making of each policy maker 
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within each jurisdiction instead of abstracting to the jurisdiction level decision 
making or majority voting decision making as the current literature does.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a more detailed 
description of Finnish municipalities and the institutional background for 
municipality mergers. Section 3 looks through previous empirical studies on 
local government mergers and coalition formation. Section 4 describes the 
econometric methods and data. Section 5 presents the empirical results and 
section 6 concludes.  
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2   Institutional background 
Local governments play an important role in the economies of many countries. 
This is especially true in the Nordic countries like Finland where there has been a 
long tradition of decentralized political decision making. In Finland, public 
goods and services are provided by two tiers of government where municipalities 
constitute the local level. Because of the variety of tasks assigned to them, 
municipalities are of considerable importance to the whole economy. The GDP 
share of municipality spending is roughly 18 percent and they employ around 20 
percent of the total workforce. Unlike in the mainstream economic models of 
local public finance, where local governments provide local public goods, the 
bulk of Finnish municipalities’ expenditures come from producing welfare 
services with a strong redistributive character. Municipalities are responsible for 
providing the most of social and health care services, primary education and 
culture services. In addition, municipalities provide the basic environment and 
technical infrastructure services along with public transportation. Municipalities 
also have a zoning monopoly within their borders.  
Municipalities fund their spending mostly through their own revenue sources. 
The most important revenue source is the flat municipal income tax which 
constitutes 40 percent of all municipality revenues. Municipalities are also 
entitled to a share of the corporate income tax paid by corporations in the 
municipality, but corporate taxes make up only about 4 percent of revenues. The 
role of the property tax is even smaller at only 2.5 percent of revenues. Due to 
the fact that most municipal services in Finland are statutory and large disparities 
in municipal population structure and density, a central government grant system 
is used to equalize local cost and revenue disparities. The grant system is based 
on calculatory costs and compensates municipalities with unfavorable cost 
conditions, expensive age structure and social problems. The system also 
includes a separate net equalization system for tax bases. The grant system 
covers 20 percent of total municipal spending. Growing regional disparities have 
led to unsustainable deficits in many small and remote municipalities and for 
them the grant system has become the most important source of revenue. 
Currently, the grant system covers more than 50 percent of all revenues for every 
fourth municipality. The rest of municipal revenues consist of user-fees and sales 
incomes. 
Another important feature of the Finnish system is the large number of 
municipalities relative to population with a large variation in municipal 
population size. The largest municipality is the country’s capital, Helsinki, which 
has over half a million inhabitants, whereas the smallest mainland municipality, 
Suomenniemi, has roughly 800 inhabitants. The median municipal population 
size is less than 6,000. Finland is also sparsely populated and population density 
varies a great deal between municipalities. The number of municipalities has 
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diminished considerable since the 1940’s as can be seen from Figure 1. There 
have been two major merger waves. The reduction in the number of 
municipalities in the 1940’s was due to losing land areas to the Soviet Union 
after the WWII. In the 1960’s almost all and in the 2000’s all of the mergers have 
been voluntary.  
 
Figure 1.  Number of municipalities in Finland, 1917–2010. 
Figure 1 illustrates that municipality structure has been quite stable through time 
but every now and then we observe a wave of municipality mergers.  This raises 
the question of why do we observe municipality mergers at a given time. 
Ellingsen (1998) argues that economies of scale are a questionable rationale for 
merging since they can be just as easily exploited through contracting or 
cooperation. In fact, cooperation in service production through joint authorities is 
quite common among Finnish municipalities.2 As Miceli (1993) argues, 
cooperation in producing some services but not others is a way to deal with the 
fact that different services have different economies of scale. One must therefore 
                                                 
2 Currently, there are 226 joint authorities set up by two or more municipalities. Joint authorities are 
independent legal entities governed by municipal legislation. They are financed by selling their services 
to municipalities. The most important joint authorities are hospital districts, basic health care, care for 
disabled and vocational education. Membership is voluntary, except that every municipality has to belong 
to a hospital district. 
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ask what the additional benefits or costs are that merging provides compared to 
cooperation. 
One apparent difference is that merging depends on and alters political power 
structures in a way that cooperation does not. There are many aspects to this 
argument. First, it is obvious that the costs and benefits of mergers are not 
equally divided among all members. Clearly there are winners and losers. In a 
democratic system with majority voting, mergers may not occur even when 
merging would be efficient. When all parties must accept the merger, a majority 
against the merger in just one municipality is enough to block it. Second, 
efficient mergers may be blocked or inefficient mergers may take place because 
of local politicians and bureaucrats self-interest. For example, municipal 
employees who are also council members may have private incentives either to 
vote for or against merging regardless of the preferences of their constituents. 
This is especially true when merging is motivated mainly on cost efficiency 
grounds. Third, council members of a particular party may find a merger 
undesirable because in the new municipality their party’s share of council seats 
would be lower or that they would face stiffer competition from members of their 
own party. Fourth, large municipalities have a stronger leverage in negotiations 
between the central government and the municipal sector.3  
On the other hand, if households have sorted themselves to municipalities in the 
spirit of Tiebout (1956), it is not clear whether one should promote or even 
expect merger activity. Some recent developments in Finland have, however, 
changed the operating environment of municipalities. A major recession in the 
early 1990s hit different regions with a different force due to differences in 
industrial composition. The subsequent recovery was regionally uneven and 
regional disparities started to grow. In particular, during the last fifteen years or 
so, regional disparities have grown rapidly because the workforce has 
concentrated into few growing centers with better employment possibilities. This 
means that both the municipalities that are losing population and the ones gaining 
have experienced major changes in their operating environment. Furthermore, 
rapid population aging continues to challenge municipal finance in the future 
because a bulk of municipal expenditures is related to health and elderly care. 
This development may be enough to encourage municipalities to search for new 
ways of cooperation in service production or even to merge.  
Due to aging-related expected increase in municipal spending and disparities in 
revenue base the central government initiated a plan (so-called PARAS initiative) 
in 2005 that aimed at reforming municipal revenue structure and more 
importantly making the production of statutory municipal services more efficient. 
                                                 
3 Finnish municipalities are self-governing bodies by constitution which means that central government 
cannot assign new responsibilities to municipalities without passing new legislation. However, the central 
government may, for example, change municipal tax bases and assign limits to property tax rates quite 
easily.   
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In 2007 these goals were made concrete by a provisional law. The main tool for 
strengthening the operating environment of municipalities set forth in the new 
law was municipality mergers. The law clearly states that municipalities should 
have strong enough revenue and labor force bases to cope with the production of 
statutory public services. Municipalities are allowed to decide for the mergers 
themselves. However, the government initiated a new subsidy scheme to 
encourage merger activity. We discuss the subsidy scheme in detail later, when 
we show how to use regression discontinuity analysis to study its effectiveness.  
Finland has a multi-party system. Currently there are eight parties in the Finnish 
parliament and these parties also dominate municipal politics, but some local 
single-issue groups exist as well. The municipal council is responsible for 
strategic and financial outlines and main objectives of municipal activities. The 
council also chooses the municipal board. The composition of the board is based 
on party shares in the council, i.e. each party in the council get seats in the 
municipal board according to their share of council seats. Thus, there is no real 
opposition in local politics. Municipal boards have a strong role because the most 
important issues prepared for the council are agreed in advance by the board.  
In this paper, we focus on mergers that took place in 2008 and 2009. The 
councils in our data were elected in October 2004 and these councils voted for all 
the actual mergers in our analysis. Thus, we can treat the mergers as a result of a 
one period coalition formation game. A given merger takes place if it gains the 
majority vote in all the individual municipalities contemplating the merger. New 
municipal councils are elected every four years.4 The councils are elected using 
list elections that apply the D’Hondt method. Each municipality has only one 
electoral district. This goes also for the merged coalitions. Council size is a step 
function of municipality’s population and is determined by law. As can be seen 
from Table A1 in Appendix A, the council size varies from 13, for municipalities 
with population 2,000 or less, up to 85 for municipalities with population 
400,000 or more. Therefore, in case of a merger of a very large municipality and 
a very small municipality, it is likely that all the council members in the new 
coalition will be residents of the former larger municipality.  
 
  
                                                 
4 See Moisio et al. (2010) for more details on municipal politics.  
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3   Previous empirical studies 
Political coalition formation has received considerable attention from both 
theoretical and empirical economists. In this section we concentrate on empirical 
contributions so that these results can be compared to ours. Alesina et al. (2004) 
examine the number of political jurisdiction, such as school districts and 
municipalities, within counties in the U.S. In particular, they test whether a trade-
off between economies of scale and population heterogeneity can explain the 
number and size of jurisdictions. Using data from the period of 1960–1990, 
Alesina et al. (2004) find evidence of a trade-off between economies of scale and 
heterogeneity in race and income. However, they do not analyze actual merging 
decisions of these entities. 
Brasington (1999) uses Poirier’s partial observability bivariate probit which 
allows for two-sided decision making to study school district consolidations in 
Ohio U.S. He finds that racial composition and the difference in racial 
composition have no independent effect on consolidation, nor do income levels 
or school quality. He argues that consolidation happens mainly with cost savings 
in mind. In particular, he finds a general tendency of small and large school 
districts to merge, whereas middle-sized districts merge less often. Brasington 
(2003a) uses the same data as Brasington (1999) but sorts the data according to 
population in order to see whether small and large communities differ in their 
preferences to merge. Brasington (2003a) finds clear differences in the way large 
and small communities react to differences in population size. The larger the 
population gap between the large and small community, the more the large 
community wants to merge. The opposite is true for small communities. He 
speculates that a large community gains scale economies while probably 
maintaining political control over schooling decisions. This result is in line with 
predictions from Ellingsen’s (1998) model. Brasington (2003b) uses the same 
sorting idea as Brasington (2003a) but now sorting is done according to income 
and race (percentage of white). That is, richer communities are compared to 
poorer and whiter to darker in each potential consolidation pair. Brasington 
(2003b) finds that the higher property values in a community are the less likely it 
is to merge. This is true for richer and poorer potential partners. When data are 
arranged according to percentage of white, the effect of property value is still 
negative but it is statistically significant only for less white communities. 
More recently, Gordon and Knight (2009) and Weese (2009) have proposed 
structural econometric methods to analyze spatial mergers. Gordon and Knight 
(2009) apply their spatial simulated method of moments estimator to school 
district mergers in Iowa in the 1990’s. They find that state subsidies were an 
important factor influencing merger decisions of school districts. They also find 
that economies of scale matter. Furthermore, heterogeneity in education level of 
district population (percentage with a college degree), heterogeneity in spending 
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and distance between potential merger partners makes merging less likely. Weese 
(2009) introduces a novel method of estimating the structural parameters of a 
coalition utility function in a coalition formation game and applies the method to 
municipality mergers in Japan. He finds that high amount of government services 
and low population are preferred.  
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4   Sampling and econometric modeling 
Econometric modeling of merger decisions is complicated for a number of 
reasons. First, merger decision making is two-sided in the sense that we observe 
a merger only if all merger parties agree to merge. Second, each municipality 
faces multiple potential merging partners but can merge only once during a given 
period. It may be challenging both to account for all the potential merger partners 
and to restrict the sum of the probabilities of all the potential mergers to one. 
Third, municipal merger choices are spatially interdependent so that a merger 
between two or more municipalities changes the choice set of adjacent 
municipalities. Finally, there is the possibility of one-to-many matching, meaning 
that coalitions that are larger than two are possible. This means that the number 
of potential partners and coalitions may be very large. In this case, it is not clear 
what the underlying population from which to sample is and it may be very 
costly to collect all the relevant data. 
There are three estimators in the literature that account for some or all of these 
features. First, Poirier’s (1980) bivariate probit model with partial observability 
can accommodate for two-sided decision making but not the other features. This 
approach has been used by Brasington (1999, 2003a and 2003b). Second, the 
matching estimator proposed by Gordon and Knight (2009) takes into account 
two-sided decision making, spatial interdependence and multiple potential 
partners but does not allow for one-to-many matching. Mergers including 
multiple municipalities are a prominent feature of our data which makes the 
Gordon-Knight estimator infeasible in our case. Third, Weese (2009) introduces 
a method of estimating the structural parameters of a political coalition formation 
game. Weese’s estimator allows for all the above features including one-to-many 
matching, which is accomplished with a clever application of Wernicke’s (2005) 
network algorithm. However, both Gordon and Knight’s and Weese’s analyses 
are more restricted than Brasington’s because their method abstracts away from 
individual heterogeneity in the decision making of potential merger partners by 
looking only at coalition level data. 
Besides theoretical limitations, Brasington’s (1999, 2003a, 2003b) applications 
of the Poirier model are somewhat problematic. Perhaps the main problem in 
many of his models is that the correlation coefficient of the error terms of the 
bivariate probit equations is exactly or close to -1 or 1 indicating a corner 
solution to the maximization problem. According to Butler (1996), error 
correlation that approaches -1 or 1 violates the regularity conditions of maximum 
likelihood, and causes the Hessian to be noninvertible or implausible t-values. 
This problem is generally related to the poor convergence properties of the 
Poirier (1980) model. A further problem with Brasington’s applications is that he 
uses post-merger district characteristics to explain mergers. If merged school 
districts tend to become more similar after merging, using post-merger data from 
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1990 to explain mergers in the 1960’s as he does is bound to produce errors in 
analyzing the effects of heterogeneity. One of the contributions of our empirical 
strategy is that we can account for both of these practical problems in our 
analysis. Moreover, our set up allows for extending Brasington’s approach to a 
multi-partner setting, thus relaxing the assumptions under which individual 
heterogeneity in merger decision making can be studied. 
Due to computational reasons, a number of important factors contributing to 
merger decisions are left out in both Gordon and Knight’s and Weese’s empirical 
applications. Moreover, the underlying theoretical models in these studies do not 
allow for political economy type questions, since they are based on maximizing 
utility functions of coalitions or individual jurisdictions (or populations of 
coalitions). For these two reasons, the characteristics of all potentially merging 
municipalities’ councils cannot be easily included in their analysis.  
Since one of our main contributions is a rich set of interesting explanatory 
variables, we will not estimate a computationally cumbersome structural model. 
Nevertheless, we can account for most of the four econometric problems raised 
earlier. We solve the first potential problem by using coalition level data, which 
abstracts away from individual municipality choices, and by applying the Poirier 
model. We do not address the second problem in this paper. In principle, it 
should be possible to adjust the likelihood functions to limit the probability sum 
of all the potential mergers involving a given partner to be below one. Moreover, 
it is possible to check after estimation whether this condition is violated in a 
particular data set. We address the third potential problem by using data only 
from a single period of the coalition formation game. Assuming the decision 
making is simultaneous, the choice set remains stable over the period. Most 
importantly, we introduce a novel choice based sampling procedure that 
addresses the fourth potential problem.  
In summary, our method deals with most of the associated econometric problems 
while allowing for much richer analysis than previous studies in terms of the 
number of covariates that can be analyzed and in terms of the heterogeneity of 
individual decision making. Our sampling method also easily accommodates 
typical methods of causal inference such as the regression discontinuity design. 
Existing structural tools are very problematic in terms of potential omitted 
variable bias since they provide no methodological tool to deal with the issue of 
unobserved heterogeneity and these models can incorporate only a limited 
number of observed variables.    
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4.1 Choice based sampling from a network 
We introduce a novel stratified choice based sampling procedure to allow for 
multi-partner mergers in a spatial context. In choice based sampling, the idea is 
to keep all the rare events in the data as a treatment group, in our case we keep all 
the mergers, and then randomly sample a control group out of the common 
events, in our case the potential coalitions that did not merge. Choice based 
sampling can be made more efficient by conditioning it on the observed 
characteristics of the treatment group. Sampling conditioned on explanatory 
variables is typically referred to as exogenous stratified sampling while choice 
based sampling is an example of endogenous sampling. Combination of these 
two is often referred to as stratified choice based sampling. This sampling 
method has been widely applied especially in epidemiology with rare diseases 
but it is also common in econometrics.5 Our sampling procedure is an extension 
to the existing literature on empirical spatial merger analysis and any matching or 
coalition formation games in general. This contribution may have its uses in 
many other applications because the statistical theory on choice based sampling 
is well developed and estimators that handle data from this type of sampling are 
readily available.6 
We follow Weese (2009) and utilize the network algorithm by Wernicke (2005) 
but in a different way. This algorithm allows us to identify the set of all the 
potential mergers from which we can sample the control coalitions. The sampling 
from all the potential coalitions of a given size can be done using the FANMOD 
software by Wernicke and Rasche (2006). The FANMOD software takes into 
account geographic borders so that municipalities can form a coalition only if all 
of them share a geographic border. Naturally, some municipalities may merge 
even if they are not neighbors. This happens when they are a part of a coalition 
including multiple municipalities that jointly form a geographically coherent 
municipality.  
Our sampling procedure is as follows. First, we select all the actual mergers into 
our sample. This endogenous sampling in necessary because a random sample 
would consist only of zeros with a very high probability (see Table 1). For each 
actual merger in the data of size n (n = number of merging municipalities), we 
sample 4 potential coalitions of equal size that did not actually take place as 
controls.7 We repeat this for all n that actually took place (in our case 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
and 10). The limitation of the FANMOD software is that it can perform the 
calculations only up to 8 merging units. Therefore, we form the four 10 member 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Breslow (1996) and Manski (1995) for a review.  
6 See e.g. Manski and Lerman (1977), Imbens (1992) and Breslow (1996). 
7 The number of controls should be decreasing in the costs of collecting the variables of interest. In the 
logit model, as large a number as possible is preferred, since rare events correction is possible (see King 
and Zeng 2001). In the Poirier model, some balance could be preferred over many observations due to the 
convergence problems. 
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potential mergers in our data by sampling from 8 partner potential mergers and 
including two neighbors that make the new coalition most circular. We stratify 
the sampling on the number of merging municipalities in this way because 
otherwise the control group would consist almost only of mergers with many 
partners thus making the estimation very inefficient. This sort of stratification is 
standard practice in choice based sampling literature. One way to interpret this 
set up is that the population of interest is the set consisting of all the potential 
coalitions.  
When using stratified choice based sampled data such as ours, Cram et al. (2010) 
show that it is important to account for two potential errors one of which 
threatens internal validity and the other external validity of the results. First, we 
need to condition the analysis on strata fixed effects. In our case the strata groups 
are defined by the different number of merger partners. Failure to do so is akin to 
introducing an omitted variable bias and will therefore result in inconsistent 
estimates regardless of the estimator that is used and downward biased standard 
errors when the typical logit estimation is applied. Second, we need to weight the 
observations based on the sampling rates, for example by using the Manski and 
Lerman (1977) weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood estimator 
(WESML). These weights can be calculated using the numbers in Table 1. It 
shows the number of actual mergers and the number of potential mergers 
sampled to our data set. Table 1 also presents the total number of potential 
mergers that could take place calculated using FANMOD. WESML weighting is 
not necessary if we are not interested in the intercepts because all the slope 
parameters are consistent when logit estimation is used, given that the model is 
fully saturated with respect to stratification. However, if we are interested in the 
intercepts or are concerned that stratification may be correlated with some of our 
discrete explanatory variables, only weighting guarantees consistent estimates. 
WESML weighting can be applied within any maximum likelihood estimation 
method.8  
 
  
                                                 
8 In STATA, this can be done either using the pweight option or the svy survey package. Imbens (1992) 
provides a more general semiparametric estimator based on the method of moments estimation. 
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Table 1. Number of coalitions in the choice based sampling procedure. 
 
 
Consistent estimation does not make this sampling approach robust to any 
endogeneity issues such as the omitted variable bias. However, one of the main 
advantages of this sampling set up is that usual methods of causal inference such 
as regression discontinuity design and instrumental variables can be used without 
any further complications. Consider the case of regression discontinuity which 
we apply in this study. Obviously, if stratification is not correlated with the 
selection into the treatment, regression discontinuity treatment effect is unbiased. 
However, if stratification is correlated with the selection into the treatment the 
issue is not as clear. Let us consider the worst case scenario of perfect correlation 
with an abstract example. Assume that we stratify based on individuals being 
under 40-years-old or over 40-years-old and the discontinuity of interest is at 40 
years. Due to a balanced stratification scheme, this would result in having exactly 
the same relation of ones and zeros in the outcome variable in either side of the 
discontinuity threshold and on average this identical relation would persist near 
the discontinuity. If we estimated the model without weighting, the treatment 
effect would always be zero. Similar scenarios can be contemplated where this 
sort of correlation would lead to either upward or downward biased treatment 
effects. Fortunately, by using the WESML weights, the population level group 
effects are estimated consistently. Thus, even with perfect correlation between 
the selection into the treatment and the stratification, weighting allows for 
unbiased estimation of the treatment effect in the regression discontinuity design.  
One practical problem with this sampling procedure in our application to 
municipality data is that large coalitions may take many different geographic 
shapes and some of the sampled coalitions may be quite unrealistic, and thus, 
would not serve as very good controls.9 For example, some coalitions of size 6 
                                                 
9 Weese (2009) faced a similar problem because the largest merger that took place during his analysis 
period in Japan included 15 municipalities. This creates problems for Weese’s estimator because the 
number of potential coalitions with a size of fifteen or less is huge. Weese circumvents the problem by 
introducing an upper bound on the number of bordering municipalities that any potential coalition can 
Coalition size Actual Control Potential
2 17 68 787
3 8 32 2 171
4 4 16 6 551
5 1 4 20 647
6 2 8 66 534
7 0 0 Not calc.
8 0 0 698 481
9 0 0 NA
10 1 4 NA
Note: The table presents the number of mergers that actually took place, the 
sampled control coalitions and the total number of potential coalitions.
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may be string-like and result in high transportation costs. In order to circumvent 
this problem, we restrict the potential coalitions so that they cannot cross county 
borders. The numbers in Table 1 include this restriction. Figure A1 in Appendix 
A illustrates municipality and county borders. From the Figure it’s clear that 
coalitions that stay within county borders (bold line) are much less likely to be 
problematic in this sense. This choice is also supported by the fact that no 
mergers took place across county borders. There are at least two reasons for this. 
First, counties constitute a middle-level in regional policy-making in Finland 
even though counties have very limited political power. For example, all regional 
administrative authorities by the central government should follow county 
division. This makes counties a natural cooperation environment for 
municipalities even in the absence of formal mergers and is probably the main 
reason, along with cultural identity and such, why merging across a county 
border does not happen. Second, county division is almost identical to hospital 
district division and every municipality has to belong to a hospital district.10  
4.2 Estimation strategies 
We use two different estimation strategies that provide answers to different 
questions. Both analyses can be conducted using the WESML-estimator to 
account for choice based sampling. The estimation proceeds as follows. First, 
using the binary logit model we study which types of coalitions are likely to 
form.11 This approach can be seen as estimating a coalition formation game in 
reduced form. Let yk denote the merger decision of coalition k, i.e. yk equals one 
if the coalition forms an actual municipality and zero otherwise. The logit model 
can be written as 
 
 (1)  1 1 2 21 0 ,k k k k ky       x β x β z δ  
 
where 1(.) is an indicator function that equals one if the statement in the 
parentheses is true and zero otherwise. The model includes three sets of 
covariates along with stratification group fixed effects. The vector x1 includes 
coalition characteristics, x2 is a vector of variables describing coalition 
                                                                                                                                               
have. This upper bound basically restricts the geographic shape of the coalitions to be reasonably circular. 
In our case restricting the mergers to within county mergers only takes care of this problem. 
10 We also extract the counties of Kainuu and Lapland from our analysis. Kainuu County is experimenting 
with a county level council, and thus, the municipalities will not merge while the experiment is ongoing. 
Lapland is an outlier in the data, with large land area and low population municipalities. Therefore, 
drawing control coalitions from Lapland would not be a good idea. Moreover, there were no mergers in 
Lapland during our analysis period. The map in Appendix A highlights these counties. 
11 We use the clogit command in STATA as Cram et al. (2010) suggest, instead of the logit command 
with group dummies. In our analysis, there is not much qualitative difference between using logit or 
clogit or whether the WESML weights are used or not. 
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heterogeneity and z a vector of municipal council characteristics at the coalition 
level.  
In addition to coalition formation, we are also interested in how individual 
municipalities’ own and potential merger partners’ characteristics and council 
characteristics are associated with mergers. In answering these questions, we 
follow the approach by Brasington (2003a) and use the Poirier model. Although 
this model is not perfect in our setup, it accounts for the most important feature 
of our data, which is two-sided decision making where each potential merger 
partner has a veto power on the merger. Brasington’s (2003a and 2003b) insight 
in using the Poirier model was to sort the data in a way that gives meaningful 
interpretations of the coefficients in the bivariate probit equations. We follow 
Brasington (2003a) and sort the data according to municipal population. This 
allows us to focus on the political power structure which changes differently for 
smaller and larger merging partners due to a merger.  
Let y1i and y2j denote the merger decisions of larger municipality i (type 1) and its 
smaller potential merger partner j (type 2). Poirier's (1980) bivariate probit model 
can be written as 
 
 (2)  1 1 11 2 12 1 11 0 ,i i i i iy u      x β x β z δ  
(3)  2 1 21 2 22 2 21 0 ,j j j j jy u      x β x β z δ  
 
where 1(.) is again an indicator function and the vectors x1, x2 and z correspond 
to municipal level variables introduced in equation (1). The error terms (u1 and 
u2) follow a standardized bivariate normal distribution with correlation ρ. Thus, 
the model allows for same unobservables affecting the merger decisions of both 
parties. Poirier’s model differs from the standard bivariate probit in that instead 
of observing both y1 and y2 we only observe their product (y1*y2).  
Table 2 clarifies the data setup in the Poirier model. Panel A illustrates potential 
mergers with only two partners. The first column in Table 2 is simply the 
identification number. The first municipality in each potential match pair is the 
larger one corresponding to equation (2). This sorting of the data allows one to 
distinguish the effects of explanatory variables separately for “large” and “small” 
municipalities. One should note, though, that a given municipality may be either 
“large” or “small” depending on the potential match pair, as is the case for 
municipality A in Table 2. 
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Table 2.  Example of data setup in the Poirier model. 
 
 
A particular challenge in using the Poirier model comes from mergers that 
included more than two municipalities. In these cases, we model the situation so 
that each municipality chooses individually whether to join the rest of the 
coalition. Panel B in Table 3 illustrates. Municipalities I, J, K and L have 
merged. In the Poirier model, we treat this observation so that in each case, one 
of the municipalities considers merging with the three others that form a 
coalition. All the potential coalitions from our FANMOD sampling procedure are 
treated the same way. The down-side of this procedure is that now the coalition 
formed by the three other municipalities is treated as if it really was a decision 
making entity. Clearly this is not the case in reality. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to exclude these artificial entities from the data if we want to include 
multi-partner mergers in the Poirier estimations. We conduct sensitivity analysis 
to check whether these artificially generated additional data points drive the 
results by using according weights. For the Poirier model, we report the 
unweighted parameter estimates and conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to 
using the WESML weights. The reason for this is that we ran a number of other 
sensitivity tests concerning the Poirier results that were easier to implement and 
faster to run using the unweighted estimator. The sensitivity tests are reported in 
more detail after the main results. 
4.3 The subsidy scheme and regression discontinuity design 
In order to encourage mergers, the central government grants merger subsidies to 
merging municipalities. The subsidy scheme consists of two parts. The basic part 
is determined according to the population of the new coalition and the combined 
Panel A:
Potential 
match pair Mun. 1 Mun. 2 Merged Population 1 Population 2
Difference in 
population 1
Difference in 
population 2
Gov. 
Subsidy
1 A B 0 20 000 9 000 11 000 -11 000 400
2 D A 1 67 000 20 000 47 000 -47 000 200
3 C B 0 21 000 9 000 12 000 -12 000 1500
4 G H 0 14 500 5 000 9 500 -9 500 320
Panel B:
Potential 
match pair Mun. 1 Mun. 2 Merged Population 1 Population 2
Difference in 
population 1
Difference in 
population 2
Gov. 
Subsidy
.. .. .. .. .. .. ..
101 I J,K,L 1 60 000 42 000 18 000 -18 000 900
102 I,K,L J 1 81 000 21 000 60 000 -60 000 900
103 I,J,L K 1 90 000 12 000 78 000 -78 000 900
104 I,J,K L 1 93 000 9 000 84 000 -84 000 900
.. .. .. .. .. .. ..
 19 
 
populations of all the municipalities involved in the merger with the exception of 
the largest municipality. An additional supplement amount is paid if the number 
of municipalities diminishes at least by two and increases as the number of 
disappearing municipalities rise. This subsidy scheme is in place from 2008 to 
2013. The subsidy to a given merger is increased by 80 percent if the merger 
took place in 2008 or 2009 and by 40 percent if the merger takes place in 2010 or 
2011.  
Table 3 illustrates the subsidy scheme in 2008–2009. It is important to note that, 
in addition to the subsidy, the government guarantees that central government 
grants are not reduced for five years after the merger even if the new 
municipality is entitled to a smaller overall grant than the merging municipalities 
individually. The subsidy scheme is clearly designed to promote economies of 
scale from the mergers as the amount paid is higher if the new municipality has 
over 20,000 inhabitants. In addition, the subsidy scheme rewards savings in 
bureaucracy because the amount paid increases in the number of municipalities 
involved in the merger. Each additional municipality in a merger increases the 
subsidy by 1.26 million Euros. In 2008 and 2009, the total amount of merger 
subsidies paid was about 220 million Euros. It is important to emphasize that the 
discontinuities in the subsidy scheme offer us a way to distinguish the effects of 
the subsidy from the role of economies of scale and from any unobserved 
heterogeneity that would potentially be correlated both with the size of the 
subsidy (whether absolute or per capita or any other function of subsidy and 
some municipal characteristics) and the propensity to merge.  
 
Table 3. The central government subsidy scheme in 2008–2009. 
 
 
The subsidy scheme has discontinuities in three dimensions. First, two newly 
formed coalitions can be identical in all respects but the one that involved more 
disappearing municipalities receives a larger subsidy. However, it is not possible 
Number of disappearing municipalities:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
over 20, over 10 7.20 8.46 9.72 10.98 12.24 13.50 14.76 16.02 17.28 18.54
over 20,  5-10 6.48 7.74 9.00 10.26 11.52 12.78 14.04 15.30 16.56 17.82
over 20, less than 5 5.76 7.02 8.28 9.54 10.80 12.06 13.32 14.58 15.84 17.10
under 20, over 7 5.40 6.66 7.92 9.18 10.44 11.70 12.96 14.22 15.48 16.74
under 20, 3.5-7 4.50 5.76 7.02 8.28 9.54 10.80 12.06 13.32 14.58 15.84
under 20, under 3.5 3.60 4.86 6.12 7.38 8.64 9.90 11.16 12.42 13.68 14.94
Population in thousands 
(first number is the new 
merged municipality, 
second number is coalition 
population minus largest):
Notes: Figures in the table are millions of Euros. The subsidy continues to increase by the same amount if there are 
more than 10 disappearing municipalities.
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to utilize this dimension of discontinuity because this forcing variable is discrete 
and follows exactly the according treatment indicator. Second, a coalition with 
just over 20,000 inhabitants gets more subsidy than an otherwise identical 
coalition with just under 20,000 inhabitants. To simplify the analysis, we do not 
use this dimension either. Using it would give us only a few more identifying 
observations but would require us to control for forcing variables in two 
dimensions. Besides complicating the analysis, it would make it more difficult to 
study the optimal population size or economies of scale effects due to having 
many different population variables in the models. Instead, we use discontinuities 
in the third dimension of the subsidy scheme; the combined population of all the 
municipalities in the coalition with the exception of the largest one. Thus, the 
forcing variable is defined as “total coalition population minus the population of 
the largest municipality in the coalition”.  
Our regression discontinuity design (RDD) is illustrated in Figure 2. We 
construct one dummy variable that gets a value of one if the potential coalition is 
“just above” the threshold of getting a larger subsidy and a value zero otherwise 
(treatment 1 in the subsequent analysis). We construct a second dummy variable 
that equals one if the potential merger is “just below” the threshold (reference 
group in the subsequent analysis). We define “just above” and “just below” as 
closer than 1,000 inhabitants. Robustness of our results with respect to this 
definition of “just” is discussed in Appendix B along with all the other robustness 
and validity checks.12 To make sure that the discontinuities in the other 
population dimension do not interfere, we assign a value zero to both these 
dummies for all the observations for which the total population of the coalition is 
between 19,000 and 21,000. We construct a third dummy variable that equals one 
when both the “just above” and “just below” variables are zero (treatment 2 in 
the subsequent analysis). We use the treatment 1 and treatment 2 variables in the 
regressions while the “just below” variable acts as the reference group. This 
allows us to interpret the parameter estimate of the treatment 1 variable as the 
effect of crossing the discontinuity, and thus, getting more subsidy.13  
 
                                                 
12 Lee and Lemieux (2010) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008) provide surveys on RDD literature and also 
provide a guide-to-practice on how to conduct research based on the design. However, they concentrate 
on the standard case of one discontinuity point. Our analysis has more in kind with, for example, van der 
Klaauw (2002) or Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010). 
13 Another estimation possibility would be to use only one treatment threshold and define the forcing 
variable as the distance to the threshold. This approach is discussed in Appendix B. 
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Figure 2. Illustration of the regression discontinuity design. 
 
The decision makers clearly have imperfect control over what side of the 
discontinuity point they are, because the municipal councilors cannot directly 
control even their own municipality’s population, much less the population 
composition of the entire coalition. If this assumption holds, the mergers are as 
good as randomly assigned to the treatment and control groups and the treatment 
effect has a plausible causal interpretation. We conduct the relevant validity 
checks for this assumption in Appendix B. 
Due to the limited number of observations and the fact that we have multiple 
discontinuity steps, we conduct the RDD analysis only using parametric 
regressions. However, we are able to conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to 
using separate parametric regressions between the different discontinuity 
thresholds as opposed to using only the pooled regressions that we report in the 
results. The RDD is incorporated to both logit and Poirier models. Thus, we are 
able to analyze the causal effect of the government merger subsidy scheme on the 
merger decisions both on the coalition level and individual municipality level. 
 
 
3.5k 7k
5.56
Coalition population – largest
Subsidy, M€
5k 10k
6.48
7.2
3.6
4.5
5.4
Coalition population less than 20k
Coalition population more than or 
equal to 20k
= reference group = treatment 1 group = amount of subsidy
 22 
 
4.4 The data and descriptive statistics 
We have linked data on municipal mergers from 2008–2009 to municipal 
characteristics obtained from Statistics Finland and to characteristics of 
municipal council members obtained from the Ministry of Justice and the Local 
Government Pensions Institution. The councils were elected in 2004 for a four 
year term and they made the decision regarding mergers in 2008–2009. Future 
mergers are decided by councils elected in 2008 and after. The 2009 municipal 
division was used already in the 2008 elections. By restricting the analysis to a 
single council and a single subsidy scheme, we can think of this set up as a one 
period coalition formation game.  
The starting point for our empirical specification is that municipalities probably 
seek economies of scale through merging but face a trade-off in terms of 
matching service production to more heterogeneous preferences of a larger 
municipality. On the other hand, large municipalities may even face 
diseconomies of scale. In the logit model, we include coalition population and its 
squared term to capture these effects. In the Poirier model, we follow Gordon and 
Knight (2009) and use a fairly general average cost function. From the 
perspective of municipality i the efficiency gain or loss from merging with 
municipality j can be expressed as  
 
 (4)   ln .ii j
c N
c N N
    
 
 
where c(.) is the average cost function for local public goods and services and N 
is population size. If equation (4) is positive there are economies of scale from 
the merger and vice versa. Specifying the function as   Nc N N    yields the 
following measure for efficiency gains 
 
 (5) 
 
     
     
economies of scale
diseconomies of scale
ln ln ln
                             ln ln .
i
i i j
i j
i i i j i j
c N
N N N
c N N
N N N N N N


          
     


 
 
If β < 0 and γ > 0, the cost curve is U-shaped. If both are negative the cost curve 
is decreasing in N and there are no diseconomies of scale. Thus, β can be 
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interpreted as an estimate of the role of economies of scale and γ as an estimate 
for diseconomies of scale if there are any.14 Using this functional form also 
solves the potential problem of multicollinearity of population size and the RDD 
forcing variable. If the number of municipalities in the coalition is two, 
population of the smaller municipality would coincide with the forcing variable 
exactly. 
In addition to economies of scale measures, we include other municipal 
characteristics, measures of heterogeneity of municipalities in a coalition and 
characteristics of municipal councils. Variable definitions can be found in Table 
A2 in Appendix A. Some descriptive statistics of our coalition level data are 
presented in Table 4. The actual mergers and the randomly sampled control 
coalitions are surprisingly similar. Even their council characteristics are quite 
similar. However, the actual mergers are smaller in terms of population. Actual 
mergers are also clearly more likely to have co-operated already before the 
merger. Existing cooperation here means that the municipalities in the coalition 
had a joint authority in producing basic health care services, which is the largest 
expenditure item for municipalities. The mean distance of population to the 
largest municipality within a coalition is larger in the control coalitions.15 
 
 
  
                                                 
14 See Gordon and Knight (2009) for details. 
15 The mean distance measure is calculated using Geographic Information System (GIS) techniques in the 
following way. We have data on population location within 250 m * 250 m grids for the whole of 
Finland, which we used to calculate a population weighted Euclidean distance from all the grids within a 
coalition to the centre of the largest municipality in the coalition. The average distance measure for a 
coalition is simply the average of these distances, which measures the average distance to coalition centre 
of persons living in a given coalition. The intuition is that if a merger goes through it is likely that some, 
if not all, municipal services will be concentrated into the largest municipality, and thus, the distance to 
services will grow for people living in smaller municipalities.  
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for coalitions. 
 
 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for municipal level data sorted according to 
population size as explained earlier. Number of observations is 420 because of 
the way multi-partner mergers are treated as described in Table 3. Differences are 
measured in absolute terms. Obviously, the larger merging partners are larger in 
terms of population. But other than that the smaller and larger merger partners 
are quite similar in terms of their characteristics. Note that many of the variables 
are measured at coalition level, and thus, are the same for both municipality 
types. The smaller municipalities are slightly more concentrated politically as 
indicated by the Herfindahl index but the difference is small. They also have a 
higher Centre Party council share, which is to be expected because the support 
for the Centre Party is highest among rural areas.  
 
 
 
 
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Number of observations
population (10,000) 3.44 3.30 5.13 9.04
mean of taxable income (€10,000) 1.23 0.17 1.16 0.18
central government grants (€10,000 per capita) 0.13 0.05 0.15 0.05
dependency ratio 0.36 0.03 0.36 0.03
cooperation 0.52 0.51 0.16 0.37
language 0.06 0.24 0.10 0.30
merger subsidy (€1,000 per capita) 0.33 0.22 0.37 0.28
mean distance to largest municipality (km) 7.94 4.46 13.3 7.85
total land area 0.11 0.06 0.15 0.19
population density 0.80 0.26 0.73 0.29
deficit 0.21 0.48 0.09 0.29
std.dev. population 1.63 2.34 2.16 4.46
std.dev. taxable income 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.09
std.dev. tax rate 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.003
sdt.dev. population density 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.28
std.dev. depency ratio 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
reduction in council size 0.45 0.14 0.45 0.14
Herfindahl index 0.31 0.12 0.31 0.09
same largest party 0.73 0.45 0.71 0.45
left-w ing party share 0.31 0.12 0.28 0.09
centre party share 0.34 0.19 0.41 0.17
share of municipal employees in council 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03
share of municipal employees in population 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01
Merger = 1 Merger = 0
33 132
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for municipalities sorted according to size. 
  
 
 
  
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Number of observations
population (10,000) 0.75 1.37 5.12 6.70
mean of taxable income (€10,000) 1.09 0.18 1.16 0.17
central government grants (€10,000 per capita) 0.16 0.06 0.14 0.05
dependency ratio 0.38 0.02 0.36 0.03
cooperation 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37
language 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36
merger subsidy (€1,000 per capita) 0.34 0.24 0.34 0.24
distance to largest municipality (100 km) 0.24 0.20 0.24 0.20
land area 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
population density 0.56 0.41 0.80 0.25
deficit 0.22 0.88 0.41 0.73
difference in population 4.37 6.15 4.37 6.15
difference in taxable income 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.11
difference in tax rates 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004
difference in population density 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
difference in depency ratio 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
reduction in council size 0.55 0.15 0.55 0.15
Herfindahl index 0.39 0.15 0.31 0.10
same largest party 0.71 0.45 0.71 0.45
left-w ing party share 0.25 0.13 0.29 0.10
centre party share 0.46 0.20 0.37 0.19
share of municipal employees in council 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03
share of municipal employees in population 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.01
420 420
Smaller Larger
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5   Econometric results 
This section presents our econometric results. First we discuss the results of the 
coalition level logit analysis. This is followed by the results from the 
municipality level Poirier analysis. At the end of the section, we discuss 
numerous sensitivity checks of the results provided by these models. 
5.1 The logit model 
The results from the coalition level logit models are presented in Table 6. Table 6 
includes three models. In the first model, we include variables that describe the 
characteristics of potential coalitions in terms of population, tax base, financial 
conditions and cost structure. In the second model, we add variables that measure 
the heterogeneity of the municipalities involved in potential coalitions. In the 
third model, we add council characteristic in order to capture the effects of local 
politics16. Although we have a rich set of covariates, there is always the 
possibility that we have overlooked or do not observe some important variables 
that drive merging. Since it is unlikely that all the unobservable factors driving 
the mergers are independent of the observable ones, the results should interpreted 
cautiously as associations rather than causal effects. One exception is the subsidy 
where we use regression discontinuity design. The reduction in council size 
measure could also allow a tentative causal inference because this variable is an 
exogenous step function based on municipal population and we control for 
population directly.17 
The results indicate that existing cooperation through a joint authority in 
producing basic health care services has a strong positive association with the 
likelihood of merging. This is an expected, but also a very interesting result 
because it indicates that merging takes place between municipalities who 
probably already benefit from economies of scale in basic health care. This casts 
some doubts on whether these mergers lead to increased cost-effectiveness in 
service production. Another expected result is that population’s average distance 
to the centre of the largest municipality clearly prohibits merging. Population of 
                                                 
16 In Table A3 in Appendix A, we present results for running these regressions in reverse order; first only 
on council characteristics and then adding other covariates. Council characteristics are jointly significant 
in a model with no other covariates, but not individually.   
17 In principle, also the council size step function would allow us to use RDD. In fact, Egger and 
Koethenbuerger (2010) use exactly this type of discontinuity. Unfortunately, the allocation to the 
treatment group is more difficult in our coalition formation setting. In principle, we could allocate 
coalitions into treatment groups if the individual municipalities were all just below or all just above any 
discontinuity and the coalition under consideration was just at the opposite side of some discontinuity 
than all the individual municipalities. Unfortunately, in our data there would not be many observations 
that could be allocated to conservatively chosen treatment groups. Therefore, we must be satisfied that the 
exogeneity of the council size function as such grants some reliability on the results concerning the 
reduction in council size. 
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the coalition, however, does not seem to matter, whereas heterogeneity in 
population size increases the likelihood of merging. Interestingly, the more 
variation there is in the tax rates of the municipalities in a potential coalition the 
more likely a merger is. This would indicate that tax competition is not 
particularly fierce among merging municipalities. Heterogeneity in dependency 
ratio is negatively associated with merging. This variable may capture age related 
preference heterogeneity concerning public services provided by the 
municipalities.  
 
Table 6. Results from coalition level logit models. 
 
 
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
population 0.81 0.61 0.31 1.07 -0.47 1.60
(population)2 -0.06** 0.02 -0.06** 0.02 -0.05 0.04
mean of taxable income 3.73 4.31 5.62* 8.54 -9.48 11.0
central government grants 55.5 52.2 60.6 70.4 98.3 50.4
dependency ratio -12.2 46.1 -30.5 89.0 -143.9 116.0
cooperation 4.08* 2.00 4.56* 2.07 5.08* 2.29
language -1.76 1.64 -2.40 2.20 -1.35 1.84
RDD treatment 1 5.14** 2.01 4.57 3.08 7.37* 3.11
RDD treatment 2 1.95* 0.88 2.04* 0.91 3.69** 0.69
mean distance -0.56** 0.25 -0.60 0.38 -0.97* 0.42
total land area -6.85 7.24 -8.68 15.7 9.9 6.41
population density 1.26 2.75 -0.61 4.39 8.15 5.83
deficit 2.14** 0.39 2.53** 0.84 0.59 0.36
std.dev. population 0.87 0.57 1.34* 0.65
std.dev. taxable income -1.73 8.86 4.84 7.06
std.dev. tax rate -37.6 485.9 330.1* 89.9
sdt.dev. population density 2.94* 1.18 6.96* 2.79
std.dev. depency ratio -54.4 50.1 -52.0** 5.80
reduction in council size 45.5* 18.8
Herfindahl index 62.2** 23.4
same largest party -0.05 0.70
left-w ing party share 1.40 3.48
centre party share -33.1* 15.0
share of municipal employees in council 61.1** 17.1
share of municipal employees in population -188.9* 80.1
forcing variable -0.15 1.97 0.90 2.49 0.46 1.91
(forcing variable)2 0.13 0.19 0.09 0.19 0.07 0.13
Number of obs.
Pseudo Log-L
Pseudo R2 0.95 0.95 0.98
Notes:  The results are from conditional logit models where stratification dummies are included in the estimation.  
** and * indicate statistical significance at 1and 5 percent level, respectively. Forcing variable = (coalition 
population - population of the largest municipality in the coalition).
165 165 165
-83 061 -78 224 -34 256
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The main variables of interest in this study are variables related to local politics 
and other characteristics of the municipal councils. The importance of local 
politics is captured with variables that measure political fragmentation, similarity 
of political power in different municipalities and party composition of the 
councils. Moreover, we aim to capture the importance of politicians’ private 
incentives in merger decisions with two variables that aim to measure the 
importance of career concerns in both political and non-political careers.  
Being a member of the municipal council in Finland is a part-time job that incurs 
practically no salary even in the largest municipalities. However, some council 
members are municipal employees (as teachers, nurses, doctors etc.), which may 
affect their attitude toward mergers, since cost savings in public service 
production are often put forth as the primary reason for mergers. The central 
government anticipated some resistance from municipal employees and enacted a 
transition period spanning five years after a merger during which municipal 
employees cannot be laid off due to merger-related efficiency reasons.  
In order to study whether councilors’ municipal employment somehow affected 
the mergers, we collected data on council members’ age and whether they are 
municipal employees. Age is important here because a council member nearing 
retirement could, in effect, be sure that he or she is not laid off before retirement 
if a merger goes through. Using this information we constructed the variable 
“share of municipal employees in council”, which is the share of council 
members who are employed by their own municipality and are under the age of 
58 at the time of the vote (retirement age is 63). These council members have the 
highest incentives to block a merger if they feel it threatens their employment in 
the municipal sector. This variable may, of course, also capture voter sentiments 
because a high share of municipal employees in the population could be 
correlated with the council share. In order to identify the effect of the potential 
merger on council member’s own career separately from its effect on their 
voters’ careers, we also include the share of municipal employees in the 
population to the model.  
Interestingly, both of these variables are statistically significant but enter with 
opposite signs. The share of municipal employees in the council is positively 
associated with merging at the coalition level, whereas the population share gets 
a negative sign. The rationale for the first result may be that the council members 
want to guarantee their and possibly their voters’ municipal jobs for the next five 
years or that they anticipate better career opportunities in the new and larger 
municipality. We are unable to differentiate between competing explanations, but 
what is important here is that the council share is significant even when 
population share controlled for. This indicates that municipal mergers are 
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affected in a significant way by council members’ self-interests as municipal 
employees.18  
Political career concerns are included in the model using the "reduction in 
council size” variable, which measures the relative amount of council seats lost if 
the merger goes through. The larger this variable is the more seats are lost in 
relative terms. This should capture changes in the re-election probability if a 
merger goes through. Interestingly, the more council seats are lost in the merger 
the more likely it is. This result is puzzling because the direction of this effect is 
opposite to what would maximize re-election probabilities. However, it again 
suggests that private interests of council members play a part in the merger 
decisions. To explore this further, we need to look at the potential heterogeneity 
of this effect using the Poirier model.   
The coefficient for the Herfindahl index, which measures political fragmentation 
in councils, is positive and highly significant. This indicates that the more 
concentrated the political power is at coalition level the more likely the coalition 
is to form a municipality. Furthermore, the share of the Centre Party is negatively 
associated with merging while the share of left-wing parties (the Social Democrat 
Party of Finland and the Left Alliance) is not statistically significant (the 
reference group consists of the National Coalition Party (conservatives), the 
Green League and some smaller parties). Somewhat surprisingly though, whether 
individual members of coalitions all have the same largest party is not important 
for coalition formation. This could be due to opposite effects that cancel each 
other out so that municipalities with same elected parties have similar 
preferences but at the same time council members may face stiffer political 
competition from the members of their own party than from members of other 
parties in the new coalition.  There is indeed some evidence of this according to 
the Poirier results reported below. 
The RDD results indicate that the merger subsidy has a positive causal effect on 
merging.19 This means that subsidies can be used to influence merger decisions, 
and thus, the subsidy program had the intended effect. Because of our choice 
based sampling scheme we do not know how the subsidy affected the overall 
number of municipalities involved in mergers. These aspects of the subsidy 
scheme are left for further research. 
  
                                                 
18 The result could also mean that municipal employees are better informed about the costs and benefits of 
merging and the situation their municipality is in. 
19 This result is fairly robust to different model specifications and validity checks. See Appendix B for 
details.  
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5.2 The Poirier model 
The results from the Poirier’s partial observability bivariate probit are presented 
in Table 7. For comparison, we have included in the Table 7 also the 
corresponding coalition level logit analysis. These logit results do not contradict 
any of the Poirier results and adds confidence to both of the analyses. Because 
the units of observation are different in the logit and Poirier analyses, some of the 
variables are not exactly the same, but we have used the closest logical 
counterparts.  
The model specifications in coalition level analysis were based on selecting the 
most interesting variables from a theory point of view. The Poirier model 
specification, however, is based on selecting the largest set of interesting 
variables that survive certain econometric scrutiny related to poor converge 
properties of the maximum likelihood estimator. These requirements are 
explained more carefully when we discuss sensitivity analysis. Although this sort 
of model selection has a flavor of data mining, we believe that it could be rather a 
signal that this particular specification is a fairly good statistical approximation 
for this particular data generating process. Despite the fact that the econometric 
properties of the Poirier model are far from ideal, this model provides such 
interesting results concerning the possible heterogeneity of our variables of 
interest, that they deserve detailed discussion here.  
In Table 7, the municipalities are sorted according to population so that the larger 
municipality (or hypothetical municipality) is always in equation (2) and the 
smaller municipality is in equation (3). Therefore, we can analyze whether the 
associations are heterogeneous with respect to size. The first result of interest is 
that the average cost curves are different for small and large municipalities. For 
small municipalities, β and γ are both negative indicating that they are on a 
downward sloping segment of the cost curve. However, for large municipalities β 
< 0 and γ > 0, which means that large municipalities are experiencing 
diseconomies of scale. Again as Gordon and Knight (2009) point out, these 
estimates of economies and diseconomies of scale should be interpreted as those 
perceived by the voters or councils when they decide on whether to merge or not. 
These may differ from actual economies of scale realized through merging. 
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Table 7. Results from Poirier’s bivariate probit model. 
 
 
Again we find that the existing cooperation is positively and significantly 
associated with merging for both municipality types. Distance, on the other hand, 
gets a negative sign but is significant only for smaller municipalities.20 This is not 
surprising because larger municipalities in a given merger can be quite sure that 
services will not be re-located to the other municipality. For larger 
municipalities, the effect of income is positive, perhaps indicating their ability to 
bear the costs of merging with the smaller and often poorer neighbors. Larger 
municipalities’ merger decisions are also associated positively and smaller 
municipalities’ negatively with dependency ratios. Municipality land area has 
                                                 
20 The distance measure here is simply the unweighted Euclidean distance to the largest municipality from 
the municipality in question. If the municipality in question is the largest municipality, distance is set 
equal to zero.   
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
constant -0.98 7.00 -15.7* 6.47 -33.9* 15.1
economies of scale -3.73** 1.04 7.28** 2.23 2.56** 0.85
diseconomies of scale -0.79** 0.25 -0.14 0.13 -0.11** 0.03
mean of taxable income -2.34 2.54 5.89* 2.53 3.08 3.69
dependency ratio -31.4* 13.8 38.1* 17.6 26.4 29.1
cooperation 2.52** 0.57 4.15** 0.90 2.65** 0.89
RDD treatment 1 0.31 1.67 1.93* 0.88 3.23* 1.37
RDD treatment 2 -0.71 1.50 2.15* 0.87 1.61 1.02
number of municipalilties -0.99** 0.31 0.49 0.33 0.22 0.47
distance -19.8** 4.82 -0.33 1.89 -15.5** 4.75
total land area -29.0** 7.19 12.9* 5.86 1.34 2.77
deficit -1.23** 0.40 0.19 0.27 0.57 1.02
difference in population -1.22* 0.60 -0.31** 0.09 -0.42 0.50
difference in taxable income -9.58** 2.79 4.75 2.60 3.56 4.30
difference in tax rates 80.8 54.2 61.9 43.1 328** 112
reduction in council size 21.0** 5.29 -20.9* 6.28 10.0* 4.88
Herfindahl index 14.6** 3.82 13.1* 4.07 23.2** 7.27
same largest party -2.07** 0.70 -0.73 0.50 0.13 0.79
left-w ing party share 8.09** 2.72 -3.09 3.00 7.46 4.25
share of municipal employees in council 17.1** 5.25 -10.6 6.36 16.2 12.3
share of municipal employees in population 33.5* 13.9 -15.3 19.5 -2.3 26.0
forcing variable 1.11 0.63 -0.11 1.11 -4.00** 1.55
(forcing variable)2 -0.36** 0.11 0.31 0.23 0.41* 0.18
Rho (95% Conf. Interval)
Number of obs.
Log-L
Notes: ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1and 5 percent level, respectively. Forcing variable = (coalition 
population - population of the largest municipality in the coalition). Some variables in the logit are not exactly the same 
as those in Poirier due to coalition level analysis. The heterogeneity variables are standard deviations instead of 
differences, actual population is used instead of scale variables and maximum distance is used instead of individual 
distance.
-52.7 -39.3
Smaller Larger Coalition logit
-0.9999993 (-1,1) NA
420 165
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intuitive heterogeneous effects. Large municipalities prefer larger land mass 
while small municipalities prefer small land mass. Both large and small 
municipalities seem to want partners that are of the same size with them. This is 
opposite to Brasington’s (2003a) findings and Ellingsen’s (1998) theoretical 
predictions. Small partners also dislike income differences. 
All the political variables seem to be important determinants of the merger 
decisions, but they seem to be more important for smaller merging partners. 
According to the political Herfindahl index it is easier to make merger decisions 
in a politically concentrated council. If the Herfindahl index captures the effects 
of population preferences instead of the effects of the council composition, we 
would expect the sign to be the opposite.21 Moreover, this is a very robust result. 
Therefore, this result can be interpreted as capturing political fragmentation 
effects instead of preferences with a fair amount of confidence.  
Smaller councils dislike merging with municipalities where the largest party is 
the same as in their own council. This could imply that the members of the same 
party in the other council are perceived as a threat in future elections. In smaller 
municipalities, a large left-wing share seems to favor merging, but for larger 
municipalities this effect is not significant. The share of municipal employees in 
the council is positively associated with merging in small municipalities. This 
result comes on top of the positive association between the share of municipal 
workers in population and the propensity to merge. For larger municipalities 
these variables are not significant. A number of things could explain these 
results, but again the important thing is that council members’ self-interests as 
municipal employees matter.  
Perhaps the most interesting and at the same time puzzling result concerning 
local politics is the heterogeneous effect of the reduction in council size. The 
results indicate, that large municipalities’ councils prefer mergers where a 
relatively small number of seats is lost (a negative sign on the “reduction in 
council size” variable), whereas councils from small municipalities prefer 
mergers where this number is relatively large (a positive sign). This result is 
exactly the opposite of what would be intuitive if strategic re-election concerns 
were important. One would expect that council members in large municipalities 
who are more likely to be re-elected in the new council would prefer a merger 
where relatively large number of seats is lost. These council members would not 
face a huge increase in competition due to a merger but would be council 
members of a larger municipality with more political power. The opposite would 
be true for councilors from smaller municipalities so that they would want to 
                                                 
21 The costs of merging would be higher on average for homogenous (high index value) than for 
heterogeneous (low index value) populations, because they would more likely lose more ability to tailor 
public services to their preferences. Thus, we would expect the sign to be negative if the Herfindahl index 
captured voter preferences.  
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maximize their thin chances of re-election by preferring mergers where only a 
small number of seats are lost.  
This result could possibly be explained by different selection processes of 
councilors in municipalities of different sizes. In large municipalities, there is 
much more competition for council seats than in small municipalities. We indeed 
observe that the share of elected councilors to all candidates in the election is 
negatively correlated with the municipal population. In large municipalities, the 
candidates who really want to be councilors are elected. Therefore they should 
also be concerned about re-election as our result shows. However, in small 
municipalities being a councilor could be more akin to a public service. Social or 
peer pressure may force some inhabitants to become councilors. Municipal 
mergers could provide a convenient way for them to get rid of these 
responsibilities. 
The following can be said to sum up the results concerning local politics. Local 
politics and councilors’ self-interest clearly matter, although some of the 
heterogeneous results are puzzling. Even though we cannot explain all of these 
results, it is clear that the political environment and the decision makers’ private 
incentives may hinder the formation of optimal coalitions. This naturally raises 
the question of which government level should make the decisions concerning 
mergers. One option is that the central government should force coalitions even 
without the approval of the municipality councils. However, there are some 
caveats to this. First, information requirements for the central government to 
form optimal coalitions are large. Second, it may not be politically feasible. 
Third, it is not clear that the central government decision makers do not have 
private incentives at stake.  
Similar to the coalition level analysis, these results again indicate that the 
government subsidy has a positive causal effect on merging for both large and 
small municipalities, although the effect is statistically significant only for large 
merger partners. Therefore, with a clever design of subsidies or other monetary 
incentives, the central government could in principle offset the potentially 
adverse effects that local politics or self-interest have on coalition formation. 
Although technically challenging, this might be politically more feasible than, for 
example, forcing merging against individual municipalities’ wishes. Based on 
our analysis, we cannot say anything about the welfare effects of this scheme, i.e. 
whether it is welfare enhancing to collect distorting taxes and pay merger 
subsidies. 
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5.3 Sensitivity analysis for the Poirier model 
Our Poirier analysis is not very reliable for a number of reasons. First, we have a 
corner solution in terms of the correlation coefficient ρ. Second, we have not 
used the WESML weights in the reported results, and third, we have not included 
the strata dummies. Moreover, the Poirier estimator, in general, has very poor 
convergence properties. Most of the model specifications that we attempted did 
not converge at all or in the best cases resulted in similar corner solutions as the 
in the reported model. The poor convergence properties also limit the extent to 
which we can conduct robustness analysis. However, we are able to conduct 
several different sensitivity analyses for the Poirier model to assess the reliability 
of these reported results. 
We use the WESML weights also for the Poirier to take into account choice 
based sampling when conducting sensitivity analysis. We also weight the 
analysis based on multi-partner mergers. These latter weights are inversely 
proportional to the number of municipalities in a coalition. Unfortunately, the 
standard errors could not be calculated when these weights were used. Standard 
errors cannot be calculated using a bootstrap either because in some of the 
bootstrap samples the coefficients explode. The best we can do is to compare the 
coefficients from these weighted estimations to the reported ones using the 
standard errors from the reported estimation. When we impose only the 
stratification dummies, but not the WESML weights, the model allows for 
standard errors. This resulted in some changes in the Poirier results. The Poirier 
analysis is subjected to many other robustness checks as well and we discuss 
which of the reported results are robust to all of the checks at the end of this 
section.  
In estimating the Poirier model, we use STATA’s biprobit command and the 
BFGS (Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno) algorithm to conduct the numerical 
optimization. BFGS seemed to work the best out of the standard options in 
STATA. We conduct sensitivity analysis also with respect to the algorithm used. 
We are also concerned that local convergence could drive the result and check 
whether the results change when using a global maximization routine instead of a 
local routine like BFGS. The global optimization was implemented with the 
Rgenoud package in R that uses an evolutionary optimization algorithm. Again, 
the resulting Hessian did not allow for calculation of the standard errors.  
Our main concern with the Poirier model is that, similar to Brasington (1999, 
2003a and 2003b), we find a corner solution in a sense that the error term 
correlation is close to minus unity as reported in Table 7. Brasington disregards 
this serious problem in all his studies. We conduct sensitivity analysis with 
respect to the correlation coefficient (ρ) by imposing a grid on the correlation and 
conduct the estimation within this grid. In other words, we fix the value of ρ to a 
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given level and then estimate the model and repeat the estimation for different 
values of ρ. This analysis reveals whether the corner solution drives the results. It 
also shows the relative importance of unobserved factors. If the results are robust 
to different values of ρ, it is likely that unobserved heterogeneity is not a major 
issue. We suggest using this type of sensitivity analysis even in models where the 
parameter ρ gains an interior value, because our bootstrap analysis revealed that 
even in such models where the original sample ρ is in the interior (we found 
some such models with our data), in less than 1 percent of the bootstrapped 
samples it remained in the interior. This again indicates that the Poirier model is 
highly unstable and requires careful sensitivity analysis. Overall, this sensitivity 
analysis casts doubts on the reliability of the Poirier model in general, and we 
have shown how to assess some of the potential pitfalls when using this model. 
The reported Poirier results in Table 7 are the ones with the largest set of 
explanatory variables that we found while being fairly robust to the sensitivity 
analysis with respect to the error term correlation. The results that survive all the 
above robustness checks are for the smaller municipalities the left-wing share, 
the Herfindahl index and distance. For larger municipalities, robust results are 
mean of taxable income, the Herfindahl index and reduction in council size. 
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6   Conclusions 
This paper analyzed empirically the coalition formation of local governments. 
We introduced a novel econometric strategy involving choice based sampling 
from a network to handle multi-partner mergers and applied the method to recent 
municipality mergers in Finland. We used two different estimation strategies that 
provide answers to different questions. First, we analyzed coalition formation 
using a simple logit analysis where a coalition consisting of two or more 
municipalities is used as the observation unit. Second, in order to allow for 
heterogeneity in the decision making of individual municipality councils, we 
followed Brasington (2003a) and estimated a Poirier bivariate probit model with 
population sorting. Our main interest was the association of local politics with 
merger decisions, a clear gap in both the empirical and theoretical literature on 
local government coalition formation. If local politics matter, the optimal 
coalition formation may be hindered further from what majority voting process 
would imply. Here optimality refers to maximizing municipal utility given the 
trade-off between economies of scale in the provision of public good and 
tailoring the public goods to heterogeneous population preferences.  
In addition, using a regression discontinuity design we studied the effectiveness 
of a central government merger subsidy scheme aimed at promoting municipal 
mergers. This allows us to evaluate a policy that can be potentially used to solve 
the problems caused by local politics. We also studied how different municipality 
characteristics and heterogeneity both within a potential coalition and between 
different merger partners are associated with merging.  
The main result from our analyses is that the local political environment has an 
important role in merger decisions. Councilors seem to act strategically 
indicating concerns over both re-election and own municipal employment. 
Furthermore, political fragmentation seems to hinder coalition formation and 
party composition also makes a difference so that a larger Centre Party share 
decreases the likelihood of merging. This means that local political environment 
may hinder the creation of optimal coalitions. Our results imply that theoretical 
and empirical work on coalition formation that abstracts away from political 
decision making process and decision makers’ characteristics may be too 
simplistic.  
Furthermore, regression discontinuity analysis reveals that the government 
subsidy scheme has had a positive effect on merging activity. This result does not 
mean that the subsidy scheme in itself is a good policy but it shows that subsidies 
can be used to achieve desired goals, for example to correct for the effects of 
local politics. The welfare effects of the scheme depend on whether the mergers 
induced by the subsidy enhance welfare more than the increase in taxes that need 
to be collected to finance the scheme. These aspects of the subsidy scheme are 
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left for further research. We also find that existing cooperation through a joint 
authority in producing basic health care has a strong positive effect on the 
likelihood of merging and that distance prohibits merging. 
The results in this paper are interesting in their own right, but they also serve as a 
first step in evaluating whether municipality mergers are an effective way of 
meeting the ultimate goal of the central government, which is to make municipal 
service production more efficient. For example, the finding that existing 
cooperation in basic health care is an important factor driving merger decisions 
could mean that a merger does not produce large efficiency gains because 
economies of scale are already exhausted through cooperation. However, we 
leave these issues for further research.  
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Appendix A. Additional figures and tables. 
 
 
Figure A1. Map of municipality mergers in 2008–2009. 
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Table A1. Council size as a function of municipal population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Population Council size
Less or equal to 2,000 13, 15 or 17
2,001–4,000 21
4,001–8,000 27
8,001–15,000 35
15,001–30,000 43
30,001–60,000 51
60,001–120,000 59
120,001–250,000 67
250,001–400,000 75
Over 400,000 85
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Table A2. Variable definitions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
population Coalition population in the logit model.
mean of taxable income Coalition level income in the logit model, municipal level income in the 
Poirier model.
dependency ratio Share of 0-15 and over 65 year-olds in the population.
cooperation Dummy that equals 1 if  municipalities in the coalition organize basic 
health care through a joint authority, zero otherw ise.
language Dummy that equals 1 if  at least one municipality in the coaltion is 
classif ied in a different language than others in the coalition, zero 
otherw ise. There are four different classes: unilingual Finnish, 
unilingual Sw edish, bilingual w ith a Finnish speaking majority and 
bilingual w ith a Sw edish speaking majority.
distance Tw o distance measures are used. In the logit model the distance 
measures the average population Euclidean distance to the largest 
municipality in the coalition. In the Poirier model the measure is the 
unw eighted maximum Euclidean distance from other municipalities to 
largest municipality.
total land area Total land area of the coalition.
popualtion density Population density measured using the focalsum method based in 1 
km grids.
central government grants Central government grants.
deficit The number of municipalities in the coalition w ith a 4-year running 
deficit of more than €1,000 per capita in the logit model. This is a limit 
set by the ministry of f inance. If  a municipality is below  this limit it has 
to give the ministry of f inance a briefing on how  to deal w ith the 
deficit. In the Poirier model the deficit is in Euros per capita. 
std.dev. population Standard deviation of municipal population in the coalition.
std.dev. taxable income Standard deviation of municipal taxable income in the coalition.
std.dev. tax rate Standard deviation of municipal tax rates in the coalition.
sdt.dev. population density Standard deviation of municipal population density in the coalition.
std.dev. depency ratio Standard deviation of municipal dependcy ratios in the coalition.
difference in population Absolute difference in municipal population.
difference in taxable income Absolute difference in municipal taxable income.
difference in tax rates Absolute difference in municipal income tax rates.
reduction in council size Relative reduction in overall council seats if  the merger goes through.
Herfindahl index Standard Herfindahl index based on party shares in the council.
same largest party Dummy that equals 1 if  municipality councils in the coalition all have 
the same largest party, zero otherw ise.
left-w ing party share The share of left-w ing parties (Social Democrats and Left Alliance).
Centre Party share The share of the Centre Party.
share of municipal employees in council The share of council members w ho are employed by the municipality 
they live in.
share of municipal employees in population The share of municipal employees in the population.
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Table A3. Additional coalition level logit results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
population 0.65 0.86 -0.47 1.60
(population)2 -0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.04
mean of taxable income -6.47 7.33 -9.48 11.0
central government grants 61.8 33.5 98.3 50.4
dependency ratio -71.4 57.7 -143.9 116.0
cooperation 3.54 2.09 5.08* 2.29
language -0.16 1.43 -1.35 1.84
RDD treatment 1 5.47** 1.77 7.37* 3.11
RDD treatment 2 2.40** 0.71 3.69** 0.69
mean distance -0.60* 0.24 -0.97* 0.42
total land area 3.78 5.64 9.9 6.41
population density 7.4* 3.64 8.15 5.83
deficit 1.02** 0.33 0.59 0.36
std.dev. population 1.34* 0.65
std.dev. taxable income 4.84 7.06
std.dev. tax rate 330.1* 89.9
sdt.dev. population density 6.96* 2.79
std.dev. depency ratio -52.0** 5.8
reduction in council size -0.43 13.1 45.5* 18.8
Herfindahl index 106.0 64.9 62.2** 23.4
same largest party 6.53 4.23 -0.05 0.70
left-w ing party share 12.7 9.42 1.40 3.48
centre party share -67.0 39.0 -33.1* 15.0
share of municipal employees in council 50.8 29.7 61.1** 17.1
share of municipal employees in population -295.7 156.0 -188.9* 80.1
forcing variable -1.58 2.54 0.46 1.91
(forcing variable)2 0.18 0.24 0.07 0.13
Number of obs.
Pseudo Log-L
Pseudo R2
Notes:  The results are from conditional logit models where stratification fixed effects are included in the 
estimation.  ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1and 5 percent level, respectively. Forcing variable = 
(coalition population - population of the largest municipality in the coalition).
-495 593 -47 586 -34 256
0.68 0.97 0.98
165 165 165
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Appendix B. Robustness checks for the regression discontinuity analysis. 
In this appendix, we report additional robustness checks for our RDD analysis 
concerning the merger subsidy. We start with a visual inspection of the jump in 
the propensity to merge in the discontinuity. In Figure B1, we have pooled all the 
four thresholds presented in Figure 2 together. This single threshold is located at 
zero on the horizontal axis of Figure B1. We calculated the distance in the 
original forcing variable to the nearest threshold for each observation so that each 
observation has a location on the horizontal axis. The purpose of Figure B1 is to 
compare the propensity to merge on both sides of the thresholds. This is a 
standard RDD graph intended as the first evaluation of the treatment effect of 
interest except that now four discontinuity points are pooled into one.  
 
 
Figure B1. The propensity to merge around thresholds. 
 
The fitted lines and their confidence intervals are based model (5) in Table B1, 
where the forcing variable is controlled using a parametric fourth order 
polynomial. The model does not contain control variables. The fit is drawn using 
the entire data set. The dots correspond to the average values of the outcome 
(merger) within bins of 1,000 inhabitants. The amount of the dots gives the 
number of observations within each bin, but all the observations are given the 
average value in the graph. Based on both the average values and the fitted line, 
-.5
-.3
-.1
.1
.3
.5
.7
.9
P
ro
pe
ns
ity
 to
 m
er
ge
-.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Distance in 10000 inhabitants
 45 
 
there is a clear jump at the discontinuity, but the jump is not statistically 
significant in this unconditional model. Moreover, there are jumps of similar size 
in other parts of the distribution, but the bins involving these jumps have only a 
few observations. It is likely that these are just small sample problems and 
therefore we proceed with the RDD analysis. 
To complement Figure B1, in Table B2 we report the RDD results using only the 
single discontinuity as the determinant of treatment and the distance to the 
threshold as the forcing variable. We run the model with parametric linear 
regressions separately on each side of the threshold while changing the number 
of polynomials from zero to four and including the same control variables as in 
largest model in Table 6. 
 
Table B1. RDD robustness with the pooled treatment and distance as the 
forcing variable. 
 
 
In order to test the robustness of our reported results in Table 6, we present two 
different models that differ in the flexibility of the forcing variable. In Table B2, 
the forcing variable is estimated separately for each of the six different areas in 
Figure 2. In other words, for each area separated by thresholds we allow for 
different parameter estimates for all the polynomials of the forcing variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
treatment -0.12 0.051 0.069 1.043 1.030
s.e. 0.389 0.441 0.467 0.644 0.705
forcing variable no linear quadratic cubic quartic
controls no no no no no
strata FE no no no no no
WESML no no no no no
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
treatment 3.402 3.310 6.08* 9.228*** 9.432***
s.e. 2.274 2.119 3.478 3.302 3.393
forcing variable no linear quadratic cubic quartic
controls yes yes yes yes yes
strata FE yes yes yes yes yes
WESML yes yes yes yes yes
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
 46 
 
Table B2. RDD robustness of the reported results with flexible forcing variable 
estimation. 
 
 
Due to the combination of flexible specification and a small sample only up to 
first order polynomials with controls or third order polynomials without controls 
can be included between the thresholds. The two regressions that include control 
variables are robust but in the unconditional regressions the standard errors 
increase as the number of polynomials increase thus making the results less 
robust. 
In Table B3, we force the effect of the forcing variable to be the same in all the 
areas, as is done in the reported results in the main text. In Table B3, model (8) 
corresponds to the largest model in Table 6. These results are very robust to 
different number of polynomials. Both the standard errors and the coefficients 
remain very similar when the number of polynomials is adjusted.  As is typical 
with RDD, control variables are needed for significant results in some of the 
models. What is atypical is that this significance is not achieved through smaller 
standard errors but through larger coefficients.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
treatment 1 1.20 2.61** 2.56 3.16 NA
s.e. 0.800 1.140 1.986 2.194 NA
treatment 2 0.95 2.08 2.40 2.42 NA
s.e. 0.648 0.895 1.654 2.003 NA
forcing variable no linear quadratic cubic quartic
controls no no no no no
strata FE no no no no no
WESML no no no no no
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
treatment 1 7.311** 12.74*** NA NA NA
s.e. 2.971 2.774 NA NA NA
treatment 2 3.710*** 7.66*** NA NA NA
s.e. 0.699 1.504 NA NA NA
forcing variable no linear quadratic cubic quartic
controls yes yes yes yes yes
strata FE yes yes yes yes yes
WESML yes yes yes yes yes
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table B3. RDD robustness of the reported results with restricted forcing 
variable estimation. 
 
 
In Table B4, we check whether the reported results are robust to the distance 
criterion that we use to define whether an observation is “just below” or “just 
above” the thresholds. We try both absolute population distance and a distance 
that is relative to the threshold value. This selection involves a trade-off between 
having more faith in random assignment to the treatment and reference groups 
(small distance) and having predictive power (large distance). It seems that a 
distance of 500 inhabitants is too small to get significant results at 5 % level but 
the coefficients are of the same size as with larger distances. The parameter 
estimate in the largest 30% inclusion criterion decreases. This somewhat 
worrying observation is probably due to not being able to use a more flexible 
specification. Overall, these results imply that our reported results are not driven 
by treatment and control group selection criterion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
treatment 1 1.20 1.25 1.27 1.44* 1.34*
s.e. 0.800 0.801 0.802 0.811 0.814
treatment 2 0.95 1.16* 1.18* 1.25* 1.33**
s.e. 0.648 0.662 0.664 0.666 0.669
forcing variable no linear quadratic cubic quartic
controls no no no no no
strata FE no no no no no
WESML no no no no no
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
treatment 1 7.311** 7.322** 7.366** 7.321** 8.136*
s.e. 2.971 3.016 3.114 3.148 4.213
treatment 2 3.710*** 3.666*** 3.694*** 3.651*** 4.756**
s.e. 0.699 0.643 0.689 0.689 1.884
forcing variable no linear quadratic cubic quartic
controls yes yes yes yes yes
strata FE yes yes yes yes yes
WESML yes yes yes yes yes
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table B4. RDD robustness of the reported results with respect to the selection 
criterion of inclusion to the treatment. 
 
 
Finally, we test the validity of our identification assumption by comparing 
forcing and control variables “just above” and “just below” the threshold in 
Table B5. First, we check whether any of the other observed characteristics get 
different values just above and below the discontinuity points. There are no 
statistically significant differences, which gives credibility to our identification 
assumption. Second, we should look for discontinuity in the density of the 
forcing variable at the threshold in order to assess the potential manipulation of 
the forcing variable in order to get or to avoid the treatment. Because we have 
more observations “just below” the threshold than “just above” the threshold, 
manipulation is not a concern in our beneficial treatment case. In summary, our 
regression discontinuity design seems valid.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treatment 1 7.809* 7.366** 6.041** 5.514 7.507* 4.767
s.e. 4.352 3.114 2.432 4.047 4.135 2.955
treatment 2 2.792* 3.694*** 2.877*** 1.420*** 3.775*** 2.212***
s.e. 1.428 0.689 0.670 0.523 1.240 0.601
forcing variable quadratic quadratic quadratic quadratic quadratic quadratic
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
strata FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
WESML yes yes yes yes yes yes
treatment criterion 500 1000 1500 10% 20% 30%
share treatment 1 4.2% 11.5% 13.3% 9.1% 10.9% 16.4%
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table B5. RDD robustness with one treatment and the distance as a forcing 
variable. 
 
 
 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
merger 31 0.097 0.301 19 0.263 0.452
forcing variable 31 0.412 0.215 19 0.622 0.270
population 31 1.501 1.231 19 3.205 5.025
mean of taxable income 31 1.095 0.148 19 1.129 0.165
central gov. grants 31 0.169 0.048 19 0.156 0.046
dependency ratio 31 0.375 0.017 19 0.367 0.028
cooperation 31 0.323 0.475 19 0.211 0.419
language 31 0.097 0.301 19 0.000 0.000
nro. of municipalities 31 2.452 0.961 19 2.737 0.653
mean distance 31 11.46 4.365 19 14.36 7.943
total land area 31 0.107 0.064 19 0.120 0.054
population density 31 0.664 0.289 19 0.675 0.286
deficit 31 0.129 0.341 19 0.000 0.000
std. dev. population 31 0.670 1.059 19 1.590 3.209
std. dev. taxable income 31 0.117 0.070 19 0.107 0.068
std. dev. tax rate 31 0.005 0.004 19 0.005 0.004
std. dev. pop. density 31 0.379 0.288 19 0.318 0.260
std. dev. dependency ratio 31 0.019 0.012 19 0.021 0.015
reduction in council size 31 0.386 0.114 19 0.454 0.090
Herfindahl index 31 0.340 0.094 19 0.319 0.086
same largest party 31 0.806 0.402 19 0.789 0.419
left-w ing party share 31 0.247 0.096 19 0.252 0.072
centre party share 31 0.453 0.148 19 0.417 0.167
share mun. emp. in council 31 0.080 0.031 19 0.078 0.033
share mun. emp. in population 31 0.060 0.011 19 0.060 0.009
Just (1000) below threshold Just (1000) above threshold
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